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ON HERRERA V. WYOMING 
BENJAMIN CANTOR* 
INTRODUCTION 
Should Native Americans be able to reclaim the hunting right 
guaranteed to them by an 1868 treaty based on advantageous 
developments in how the Supreme Court interprets such treaties? Or 
should past precedents denying that right deprive them of a chance to 
re-litigate the issue? In Herrera v. Wyoming,1 the Supreme Court is 
considering how to reconcile the Crow Tribe’s hunting right with 
Wyoming’s sovereignty. This endeavor requires examining nineteenth-
century treaties and precedents to decipher the intents of the Crow 
Tribe and the United States government. If the Court’s decision 
includes a clear articulation of whether Native American treaty rights 
may be truncated by mere implication, tribes nationwide may be at 
risk of losing treaty rights they have enjoyed for centuries. 
In making its decision, the Supreme Court will also have to weigh 
the advantages and disadvantages of overturning precedent and of 
undermining its underlying rationale. In this Commentary, I argue 
that the lower courts erred in applying issue preclusion and in relying 
on the outdated Race Horse doctrine. 
I. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
A. Facts 
Clayvin Herrera is an enrolled member of the Crow Tribe of 
Indians; he lives on the Crow Reservation in St. Xavier, Montana.2 
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 1.  Herrera v. Wyoming, 138 S. Ct. 2707 (NO. 17-532) (2018). 
 2.  Joint Appendix at 185, Herrera v. Wyoming, 138 S. Ct. 2707 (2018) (NO. 17-532), 2018 
WL 4928044, at *185 [hereinafter Joint Appendix]. 
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Herrera and other Tribe members went hunting on the Crow 
Reservation in January 2014.3 While pursuing a herd of elk, Herrera 
and his companions left the Crow Reservation and crossed into 
Wyoming’s Bighorn National Forest, where they shot three elk.4 The 
party then returned to the Reservation with the meat.5 Herrera was 
cited for two criminal misdemeanors: one for taking an antlered big 
game animal without a license or during a closed season, and the 
other for being an accessory to the same offense.6 
B. Procedural History 
In July 2015, Herrera filed a motion to dismiss with the Wyoming 
Circuit Court, arguing that he had a right to hunt off the Reservation 
under Article Four of the Second Treaty of Fort Laramie, a treaty 
between the Crow Tribe and the United States.7 The Court denied the 
motion, reasoning that the Crow Tribe did not have an off-reservation 
treaty hunting right pursuant to the Tenth Circuit’s holding in Repsis.8 
The Wyoming Supreme Court denied Herrera’s petition for review in 
November 2015, and the Wyoming District Court dismissed his 
interlocutory appeal in April 2016.9 Both the Wyoming Supreme 
Court and the United States Supreme Court denied Herrera’s 
requests for a stay.10 
At trial in April 2016, a jury convicted Herrera of both 
misdemeanor charges.11 Herrera appealed to the district court, 
contesting the circuit court’s pretrial decision on the treaty right’s 
validity.12 The district court affirmed the conviction.13 Herrera next 
filed a petition for review with the Wyoming Supreme Court, which 
denied review without explanation.14 The United States Supreme 
Court then granted certiorari.15 
 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id. at *186. 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Id. at *255 (citing WYO. STAT. ANN. § 23-3-102(d), 23-6-205 (2018)). 
 7.  Brief for Petitioner at 14, Herrera v. Wyoming, 138 S. Ct. 2707 (2018) (NO. 17-532), 
2018 WL 4293381, at *14 [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner]. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 7, at *15. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. at *16. 
 14.  Id. at *17. 
 15.  Wyoming, 138 S. Ct. 2707. 
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Herrera’s claims rely on treaties, statutes, and precedents. These 
sources of law are susceptible to conflicting interpretations and 
resolving these conflicts is essential to determining whether the Crow 
Tribe has a right to hunt on the disputed land. To understand the roles 
these sources play in this dispute it helps to consider the origin and 
text of each. 
A. The Second Treaty of Fort Laramie 
In May 1868, the Crow Tribe and the United States signed the 
Second Treaty of Fort Laramie (Crow Treaty).16 The Crow Treaty 
established the Crow Reservation in present-day Montana.17 In 
exchange, the Tribe ceded the remainder of its land to the United 
States.18 The Crow Treaty provided, however, that the Tribe would 
retain certain rights in the ceded land.19 Specifically, the Crow Treaty 
stated that the Tribe “shall have the right to hunt on unoccupied lands 
of the United States so long as game may be found thereon, and as 
long as peace subsists among the whites and Indians on the borders of 
the hunting districts.”20 
B. Wyoming’s Statehood 
In 1890, Congress formally admitted Wyoming to the Union “on 
an equal footing with the original States in all respects whatever.”21 
The Statehood Act granted to Wyoming only those public lands 
expressly provided for therein.22 The Act did not mention the Crow 
Treaty.23 
C. Forest Reserve Act & Bighorn National Forest 
In 1891, Congress enacted the Forest Reserve Act, which 
authorized the President to “set apart and reserve” certain tracts of 
 
 16.  Treaty Between the United States of America and the Crow Tribe of Indians, US-
Crow, May 7, 1868, 15 Stat. 649 [hereinafter Crow Treaty]. 
 17.  See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 547–48 (1981) (describing how the Crow 
Treaty provided for the establishment of the Crow Reservation). 
 18.  See Crow Treaty, art. IV (“The Indians . . . will make said reservation their permanent 
home, and they will make no permanent settlement elsewhere.”). 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Wyo. Act of Admission, ch. 664, § 1, 26 Stat. 222 (1890) [hereinafter Statehood Act]. 
 22.  See id. at § 12 (“The state of Wyoming shall not be entitled to any further or other 
grants of land for any purpose than as expressly provided in this act.”). 
 23.  See generally id. 
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public lands as “public reservations.”24 The Forest Reserve Act 
provides: 
“[N]othing in this act shall change, repeal, or modify any 
agreements or treaties made with any Indian tribes for the disposal 
of their lands, or of land ceded to the United States to be disposed 
of for the benefit of such tribes . . . and the disposition of such 
lands shall continue in accordance with the provisions of such 
treaties or agreements.”25 
In 1897, President Grover Cleveland exercised his authority under 
the Forest Reserve Act in issuing a proclamation that established the 
“Big Horn Forest Reserve” (Bighorn) in northern Wyoming.26 The 
land on which this forest was later established was located within the 
tract of land that the Crow Tribe ceded in the Treaty.27 
D. Race Horse, Repsis, and Mille Lacs 
In Ward v. Race Horse,28 the United States Supreme Court 
considered a treaty between the United States and the Bannack 
Indians that contained a provision identical to a provision of the Crow 
Treaty.29 The Court noted a conflict between the Bannack’s treaty 
hunting right and the equal footing doctrine, which mandates that 
Wyoming have the same ability to regulate hunting within its borders 
as any of the other states existing at the time Wyoming was created.30 
In resolving the conflict, the Court determined that the Bannack’s 
treaty hunting right was a “temporary and precarious” right, 
terminated when Wyoming became a state.31 The Court reasoned that 
the right was temporary because Congress had the power to 
unilaterally terminate it by selling the land.32 
 
 24.  Act of Mar. 3, 1891, § 24, 26 Stat. 1103, as amended, 16 U.S.C. § 471 (repealed 1976). 
 25.  See id. at § 10. 
 26.  Presidential Proclamation No. 30, 29 Stat. 909 (Feb. 22, 1897). The forest’s name was 
changed from “Big Horn” to “Bighorn” in 1908. See The National Forests of the United States, 
FOREST HISTORY SOCIETY, https://foresthistory.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/National-
Forests-of-the-U.S.pdf. 
 27.  Crow Tribe of Indians v. Repsis, 73 F.3d 982, 985 (10th Cir., 1995). 
 28.  Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504 (1896). 
 29.  See Treaty Between the United States of America and the Eastern Band of 
Shoshonees and the Bannack Tribe of Indians, art. IV, July 3, 1868, 15 Stat. 674–75, (the Treaty 
reserved for the Bannack Tribe the right to hunt on the “unoccupied lands of the United 
States”). 
 30.  Race Horse, 163 U.S. at 514–15. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. at 510. 
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Nearly a century after Race Horse was decided, a Crow tribal 
member was charged and convicted for hunting in Bighorn in Crow 
Tribe of Indians v. Repsis.33 The Crow Tribe disputed the district 
court’s finding that Race Horse foreclosed the Tribe’s hunting right.34 
The Crow Tribe argued that the Supreme Court had since rejected 
several of the legal doctrines applied in Race Horse.35 The Tenth 
Circuit disagreed, concluding that Race Horse remained “compelling, 
well-reasoned, and persuasive.”36 The Tenth Circuit issued an 
“alternative basis for affirmance” to buttress its decision.37 According 
to the court, the Crow Tribe’s hunting right was abrogated when “the 
creation of the Big Horn National Forest resulted in the ‘occupation’ 
of the land [that they had ceded].”38 
Four years later in 1999, the Supreme Court revisited the Race 
Horse doctrine in Minnesota v. Mille Lacs.39 Unlike in Race Horse, the 
Court concluded that Minnesota’s admission to the Union did not 
terminate the Indian treaty rights at issue.40 The Court explained that 
it had “consistently rejected” the “conclusion undergirding the Race 
Horse Court’s equal footing holding.”41 The Court subsequently 
declared, “because treaty rights are reconcilable with state 
sovereignty . . . statehood by itself is insufficient to extinguish Indian 
treaty rights to hunt, fish, and gather on land within state 
boundaries.”42 
Despite repudiating the equal footing doctrine, the Court still 
preserved the outcome of Race Horse, determining that it contained 
an “alternative holding” that remains good law.43 The Court found 
that the analysis under Race Horse requires determining “whether 
Congress . . . intended the rights secured by the . . . [t]reaty to survive 
statehood.”44 The Court distinguished the treaty in Race Horse from 
 
 33.  Crow Tribe of Indians v. Repsis, 73 F.3d 982 (10th Cir., 1995). 
 34.  Id. at 986. 
 35.  See id. at 988 (included among the Race Horse legal doctrines that the Tribe argues the 
Supreme Court has altered are: state plenary control over game, the equal footing doctrine, 
treaty construction, and reconciliation of state regulatory authority and Indian off-reservation 
hunting rights). 
 36.  Id. at 994. 
 37.  Id. at 993. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 203–08 (1999). 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id. at 205. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Id. at 207. 
 44.  Id. 
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that in Mille Lacs by highlighting how only the former tied the 
“duration of the rights to the occurrence of some clearly 
contemplated event.”45 The Court concluded that unlike the one in 
Mille Lacs, the treaty in Race Horse thus clearly demonstrated 
Congress’s intent for the tribe’s hunting rights to expire upon 
statehood.46 
III. HOLDING 
The Wyoming District Court upheld Herrera’s conviction.47 The 
court found that Repsis, involving similar facts and legal arguments, 
precluded Herrera’s arguments.48 Herrera had argued that Mille Lacs 
called for an exception to issue preclusion because it “constitute[d] an 
intervening change in the applicable legal context.”49 Although the 
court recognized this as a legitimate exception to the doctrine, it 
rejected its application because “the legal framework [was] 
unchanged.”50 Finally, the court decided it was proper to deem the 
treaty right terminated even if issue preclusion was inapplicable.51 
According to the court, Wyoming’s statehood and the creation of 
Bighorn, which resulted in the land’s occupation, abrogated the Crow 
Tribe’s hunting right. This is significant because the Treaty only 
provided a right to hunt on “unoccupied lands” and therefore no 
longer applied to Bighorn.52 
IV. ARGUMENTS 
A. Petitioner’s Arguments 
1. The Crow Tribe Still Have a Hunting Right in Bighorn 
Herrera argues that his hunting right under the Crow Treaty has 
not been abrogated.53 According to Herrera, the parties did not 
 
 45.  Id. at 207–08. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 7, at *16. 
 48.  See id. (noting the court’s conclusions that (1) the issue here was identical to the one 
decided in Repsis; (2) the finding that the treaty hunting right was temporary in Repsis was 
necessary to that judgment; (3) Herrera was in privity with one of the parties in Repsis—the 
Crow Tribe; and (4) the Crow Tribe had a full and fair opportunity to litigate in Repsis). 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Id. at *16–17. 
 52.  See Crow Treaty, art. IV, supra note 16 (stating that the Crow Tribe “shall have the 
right to hunt on unoccupied lands of the United States”) (emphasis added). 
 53.  See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 7, at *22–45. 
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contemplate Wyoming’s statehood terminating the hunting right 
because such an event was not included in the Crow Treaty’s list of 
events that could extinguish the right.54 Herrera notes that Mille Lacs 
repudiated the concept of statehood’s impliedly terminating Indian 
rights.55 
The Crow Treaty did contemplate “the lands becom[ing] 
occupied.”56 Herrera argues that both parties understood “occupied” 
to be synonymous with “settled” because the Crow Treaty has 
elements linking the two terms.57 For example, the Crow Treaty 
provides for tribal occupation of the land by simultaneously declaring 
that others could not “settle upon” the land.58 
Herrera further argues that the use of the phrase “settlement” in 
President Cleveland’s proclamation illustrates that the land was not 
then and is not now occupied.59 Herrera cites contemporaneous 
dictionary definitions of the terms “occupy” and “settle” to show that 
the Tribe and the United States government understood the terms to 
be synonymous.60 Since the proclamation barred “entry or 
settlement,” it follows that the proclamation, according to the parties’ 
understandings of its terms, barred occupation and thus classified the 
land as unoccupied.61 
2. Issue Preclusion Does Not Bar Herrera From Addressing the 
Hunting Right’s Validity 
Herrera next claims that issue preclusion does not bar his claim 
because Mille Lacs represented a change from Repsis of the 
applicable legal context.62 Herrera illustrates both how Repsis relied 
 
 54.  See id. at *24 (“Wyoming’s statehood is conspicuously absent from that list.”). 
 55.  See id. at *28 (quoting Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 
172, 205 (1999)) (“[S]tatehood by itself is insufficient to extinguish Indian treaty rights to hunt, 
fish, and gather on land within state boundaries.”). 
 56.  Crow Treaty, art. IV, supra note 16. 
 57.  See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 7, at *33–34 (citing Washington v. Wash. St. Com. 
Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 675 (1979)) (arguing that the Indians’ limited 
command of English lends weight to the conclusion that they understood the terms to be 
synonymous). 
 58.  See id. at *33 (quoting Crow Treaty, art. II, supra note 16). 
 59.  Id. at *36–37. 
 60.  Id. at *36. 
 61.  See id. at *37 (“[I]t is difficult to imagine how the proclamation could have rendered 
the land any more unoccupied than by prohibiting anyone from ‘enter[ing] or mak[ing] 
settlement upon’ it.”) (alterations in original). 
 62.  Id. at *47–48. 
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heavily on Race Horse63 and how the reasoning of Race Horse was 
subsequently repudiated in Mille Lacs.64 According to Herrera, the 
Supreme Court’s repudiation of Race Horse qualifies as a mere 
change in the legal context.65 
Herrera responds to Wyoming’s contention that he is bound by 
the conclusion in Repsis that Bighorn is occupied by emphasizing that 
this was only an “alternative basis for affirmance” and therefore 
should not be entitled to preclusive effect.66 First, the Restatement 
(Second) of Judgments67 provides that “a judgment [that] . . . is based 
on determinations of two issues . . . is not conclusive with respect to 
either issue.”68 Second, the Crow Tribe lacked a full and fair 
opportunity to litigate whether Bighorn was “occupied” because, inter 
alia, the state did not address this issue in its opening brief.69 
B. Respondent’s Arguments 
1. Repsis Precludes Herrera From Asserting a Hunting Right 
Wyoming argues that all three elements of issue preclusion are 
met in this case.70 First, the matter was actually and necessarily 
determined.71 Second, neither party disputes that federal courts are of 
competent jurisdiction for interpreting Indian treaties.72 Third, 
Herrera’s membership in the Crow Tribe binds him to the Repsis 
 
 63.  See id. at *47 (citing Crow Tribe of Indians v. Repsis, 73 F.3d 982, 994 (10th Cir., 
1995).)) (noting the Tenth Circuit’s description of Race Horse as “compelling, well-reasoned, 
and persuasive”). 
 64.  See id. at *48 (citing Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 
219 (1999)) (noting how Justice Rehnquist, writing in dissent, described Mille Lacs as a decision 
that “effectively overruled” Race Horse). 
 65.  Id. (citing Comm’r v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 599 (1948)). 
 66.  See id. at *49 (citing Repsis, 73 F.3d at 993) (“[I]t bears noting that the Wyoming 
District Court did not base its issue preclusion ruling on that ground, which is hardly surprising 
given that the state made no such argument before it.”). 
 67.  A source that Herrera notes the Supreme Court routinely consults; see id. at *50 (citing 
various cases supporting this proposition). 
 68.  Id. at *50 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. i (1982)). 
 69.  See id. at *52 (describing how the state offered no argument about the “occupation” of 
Bighorn in the Repsis district court and how the Repsis district court did not address the 
question either). 
 70.  See Brief for Respondent at 23, Herrera v. Wyoming, 138 S. Ct. 2707 (2018) (NO. 17-
532), 2018 WL 6012360, at *23 (quoting Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979)) 
(“[O]nce an issue is [1] actually and necessarily determined [2] by a court of competent 
jurisdiction, that determination is conclusive in subsequent suits based on a different cause of 
action involving [3] a party to the prior litigation.”). 
 71.  See id. (explaining that Repsis actually resolved that Crow tribal members are subject 
to Wyoming law and that it necessarily did so because the Tribe’s Complaint initiated the case). 
 72.  Id. 
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interpretation of the Crow Treaty.73 
Next, Wyoming questions the notion that Mille Lacs represents a 
change in the legal context from Repsis.74 Wyoming interprets Mille 
Lacs to stand for the proposition that statehood does not 
automatically extinguish tribal hunting rights.75 The Mille Lacs 
holding therefore does not, according to Wyoming, represent a total 
repudiation of Race Horse.76 Instead, Mille Lacs preserves the 
“narrow alternative holding” of Race Horse, which was that the 
specific treaty rights at issue in that case did expire upon statehood.77 
Since the treaty provision in this case is identical to the one in Race 
Horse, the applicable legal context has not changed.78 
In responding to Herrera’s issue preclusion argument, Wyoming 
questions the Restatement’s approach to issue preclusion altogether.79 
Wyoming asserts that the Supreme Court’s approach to issue 
preclusion has been much narrower than the approach called for by 
the Restatement.80 Adopting a broader understanding of the 
exception, Wyoming argues, would undermine judicial finality.81 
Wyoming further contends that Herrera is precluded from 
challenging the Tenth Circuit’s conclusion that Bighorn is occupied.82 
First, in addressing Herrera’s attempt to undermine the “alternative 
holding” of Repsis, Wyoming argues that an alternative holding is as 
valid as any other.83 Second, Wyoming characterizes the Tenth 
Circuit’s conclusion as a reason underlying the decision rather than as 
an “alternative holding.”84 
 
 73.  See id. at *23–24 (concluding that Herrera’s membership in the Crow Tribe binds him 
to the Repsis decision). 
 74.  Id. at *25–34. 
 75.  Id. at *28. 
 76.  See id. (stating that “the Race Horse decision survived Mille Lacs”). 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  See id. at *29 (arguing that Race Horse “has direct application for . . . the Treaty with 
the Crows”). 
 79.  See id. at *30 (“[T]he Court should not enshrine the Restatement’s approach here.”). 
 80.  Id. at *31. 
 81.  Id. at *33–34. 
 82.  Id. at *36–38. 
 83.  See id. at *37 (quoting United States v. Title Ins. & Tr. Co., 265 U.S. 472, 486 (1924)) 
(“[W]here there are two grounds . . . each is the judgment of the court and of equal validity with 
the other.” (alteration in original)). 
 84.  See id. at *37–38 (stating that Herrera’s argument conflates the Repsis judgment with 
its reasoning and determining that the Tenth Circuit’s conclusion about the forest’s being 
occupied was an explanation for the ruling rather than a separate judgment). 
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2. The Crow Treaty Does Not Grant a Permanent Right to Hunt 
in Bighorn 
Next, Wyoming argues that the Crow Treaty only granted the 
Crow Tribe the right to hunt until non-Indians began to occupy the 
land ceded in the Treaty.85 The Crow Treaty’s use of the term “hunting 
districts,” Wyoming contends, provides strong evidence that the right 
was intended to be only temporary.86 The contemporary context of the 
government’s reservation policy and the imminent westward 
expansion of non-Indians support the inference that both parties 
understood the temporary nature of the right.87 
Wyoming strengthens its argument by emphasizing that the 
Supreme Court already examined Congress’s intent with respect to 
the Crow Treaty in Race Horse.88 Honoring the doctrine of stare 
decisis would require sustaining the Court’s original interpretation.89 
V. ANALYSIS 
Neither Race Horse nor Repsis should preclude Herrera’s claims 
because of the flawed reasoning underlying both decisions. The 
Supreme Court has declared that a “change in the applicable legal 
context” may suffice to defeat issue preclusion.90 In Bobby v. Bies, the 
Supreme Court unanimously concluded that a legal development that 
merely altered a party’s litigation strategy was enough to defeat issue 
preclusion.91 Here, the relevant legal development was a repudiation 
of the entire foundation of the precedent at issue. The contrast 
between the Tenth Circuit’s describing Race Horse as “compelling, 
well-reasoned, and persuasive”92 and the Supreme Court’s stating that 
“Race Horse rested on a false premise”93 is stark. Given this 
significant legal development, Herrera’s claims should not be 
precluded. 
 
 85.  Id. at *40. 
 86.  See id. at *43 (“The hunting districts were wilderness that had not yet seen the march 
of advancing civilization.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 87.  See id. at *44 (contending that the very purpose of the Crow Treaty was to mandate a 
separation between Indians and incoming non-Indians). 
 88.  See id. at *53 (arguing that “Wyoming and its citizens have relied on the interpretation 
from Race Horse for 122 years”). 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Bobby v. Bies, 556 U.S. 825, 834 (2009) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
JUDGMENTS § 28 cmt. c)). 
 91.  Id. at 836–37. 
 92.  Crow Tribe of Indians v. Repsis, 73 F.3d 982, 994 (10th Cir., 1995). 
 93.  Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 204 (1999). 
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The prominence of “alternative holdings” in Race Horse and 
Repsis further weakens their precedential value in this case. First, the 
Supreme Court’s choice not to overturn Race Horse while repudiating 
its foundation created the confusion that currently surrounds the 
doctrine. One problem with the Court’s decision to preserve the 
“alternative holding”94 of Race Horse is that it neglects the way in 
which this holding was informed by the since-repudiated equal 
footing doctrine. 
Underlying the Court’s decision in Race Horse was the 
assumption that Congress would not enter into a treaty that might 
hamper the autonomy of a future state.95 Since the lands ceded by the 
Crow Tribe would eventually be engulfed by a newly formed state, the 
parties must have known that the right to hunt on that land would 
expire upon statehood.96 To presume otherwise would “render 
necessary the assumption that congress [sic] . . . created a provision . . . 
irreconcilably in conflict with the powers of the states.”97 This line of 
reasoning led to the Court’s inference in Race Horse that the hunting 
right was “temporary and precarious,”98 an inference that was 
subsequently rejected in Mille Lacs.99 The outdated equal footing 
doctrine substantially influenced the “alternative holding” of Race 
Horse. 
The Tenth Circuit’s “alternative basis for affirmance” in Repsis 
also played a substantial role in the outcome of that dispute.100 The 
limited support the Tenth Circuit provided for concluding that 
Bighorn was occupied, thus abrogating the hunting right,101 
demonstrates that the alternative holding in Repsis should not 
preclude Herrera’s claims. Further reasons for deciding against issue 
preclusion include the state’s initially not offering any argument 
about this issue in the lower court102 and the Tenth Circuit’s 
 
 94.  Id. at 206. 
 95.  Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504, 509 (1896). 
 96.  Id. at 508–10. 
 97.  Id. at 509. 
 98.  Id. at 510, 515. 
 99.  See Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 206–07 (1999) 
(“[T]he ‘temporary and precarious’ language in Race Horse is too broad to be useful in 
distinguishing rights that survive statehood from those that do not.”). 
 100.  See Crow Tribe of Indians v. Repsis, 73 F.3d 982, 993 (10th Cir., 1995). 
 101.  See id. (noting that the creation of Bighorn National Forest resulted in the 
“occupation” of the land because “these lands were no longer available for settlement”). 
 102.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 7, at *52. 
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determination not being subject to plenary appellate review.103 
Allowing a decision based on a limited analysis to serve as the basis 
for issue preclusion would be inconsistent with a key premise of the 
preclusion doctrine: “an underlying confidence that the result 
achieved in the initial litigation was substantially correct.”104 Only 
well-reasoned conclusions should be determinative in resolving future 
similar disputes. 
Even though Race Horse and Repsis squarely apply to the issues 
in this case, they should not dictate the outcome here. Wyoming’s 
attempt to rely on precedent is based, in part, on appealing to the 
Supreme Court’s characterization of honoring stare decisis as “a 
foundation stone of the rule of law.”105 The stare decisis doctrine 
embraces the theory that it is often “more important that the 
applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.”106 
It is important to recognize, however, that adhering to stare decisis 
“is not an inexorable command.”107 In 2018, the Supreme Court 
articulated five factors that should be considered when deciding 
whether a precedent should dictate the outcome of a future case.108 
The first (and perhaps most important) factor is the quality of the 
applicable precedent’s reasoning.109 The extent to which the Supreme 
Court disparaged the reasoning of Race Horse in Mille Lacs 
demonstrates that honoring stare decisis does not mandate concluding 
that Race Horse determines the outcome of this case. The minimal 
rationale supporting the alternative holding in Repsis indicates that 
said holding should not command the outcome here. 
CONCLUSION 
Examining this case on the merits is necessary in light of the 
substantial legal developments that have occurred since the last 
dispute involving the Crow Tribe’s treaty right nearly twenty-five 
years ago. The Supreme Court’s decision in Mille Lacs to partially 
 
 103.  Id. at *51. 
 104.  Bravo-Fernandez v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 352, 358 (2016) (quoting Standefer v. 
United States, 447 U.S. 10, 23, n. 18 (1980)). 
 105.  Michigan v. Bay Mills, 572 U.S. 782, 798 (2014). 
 106.  Kimble v. Marvel, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2409 (2015) (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil 
& Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). 
 107.  Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 809 (1991). 
 108.  See Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Mun. Employees, Council 31, 
et al., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2478–79 (2018) (listing the five factors). 
 109.  Id. 
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preserve the Race Horse holding while repudiating its reasoning 
warrants a full reconsideration of the doctrine. Herrera v. Wyoming 
provides an opportunity for the Court to clarify its framework for 
resolving conflicts between Native American treaty rights and state 
sovereignty. 
 
